Soyuz 3: Getting the Soviet Union Back Into the Moon Race

Early 1967 proved to be a disastrous time for both the American and Soviet manned space programs with the loss of astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee in the Apollo 1 pad fire on January 27 and the death of cosmonaut Vladimir Komorov in the crash landing of Soyuz 1 on April 24. As the investigation and subsequent recovery of the Apollo program took place under the watchful eye of the American public, similar efforts took place behind the scenes in the Soviet Union with the Soyuz program. By October of 1968, both nations were poised to restart manned flights of the Apollo and Soyuz in the hopes of resuming their race to be the first to land humans on the Moon.

 

The Origins of the Soyuz

The origins of the Soyuz spacecraft, including today’s updated Soyuz MS which ferries crews to the International Space Station, can be traced back to a series of design studies performed at OKB-1 (the Russian acronym for “Experimental Design Bureau – 1”) starting in December 1961 under the direction of the pioneering Soviet aerospace engineer, Chief Designer Sergei Korolev. The Soyuz complex, as it was called starting in April 1962, was a proposal for a manned circum-lunar mission with a crew of two which would be assembled and fueled in low Earth orbit using upgraded three-stage variants of the four-stage 8K78 launch vehicle which had been used to launch the first Soviet planetary probes starting in 1960 (see “The First Mars Mission Attempts”).

While the original circumlunar mission was scrapped in 1964 in favor of simpler lunar mission architectures, these studies did lead to the development of a whole family of manned spacecraft based on the Soyuz 7K design for missions in Earth orbit as well as to the Moon beyond. The first version, designated 7K-OK (where OK is the Russian acronym for “orbital ship”), was officially approved for development by a Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) decree on August 18, 1965.

The standard Soyuz design consisted of three modules. At the bottom was the roughly cylindrical service module with a diameter of 2.7 meters at the base a height of 2.5 meters. It carried the spacecraft’s redundant propulsion and attitude control systems as well as other equipment needed to support the crew and their mission while in orbit. The 7K-OK service module (SM) was fitted with a pair of wing-like solar panels to recharge batteries which provided power for the spacecraft. Next was the 2.2-meter in diameter, bell-shaped descent module (DM) where the crew would ride during the mission. It was fitted with a heat shield, parachutes and other recovery aids to bring the crew of up to three cosmonauts back to Earth at the end of their mission. On top of this was the roughly spherical orbital module (OM) which provided about five cubic meters of habitable space for the crew during their mission and would be jettisoned before the return to Earth. On top of the earliest versions of the orbital module was a probe-and-drogue type docking system but, with no provisions for an internal crew transfer at this point, the crew would need to perform an EVA to transfer from one ship to another with the orbital module serving as an airlock. This three-module arrangement maximizes the habitable volume of a spacecraft of a given mass and was even considered in some earlier American Apollo design proposals.

The Soyuz 7K-OK, with a launch mass of about 6,500 kilograms, would start its ascent protected by a fairing topped with a launch escape system (LES) which would pull the crew to safety in case of an abort during the first 160 seconds of the ascent (see “A Brief History of Launch Aborts”). The launch vehicle for the Soyuz 7K-OK was the 11A511 which would later be known simply as “Soyuz” as well. This launch vehicle is the ancestor of the 14A14 “Soyuz-2” rocket used today. The 11A511, whose development started in 1963, was a modified version of the earlier 11A57 unified launcher which was used to orbit a number of Soviet spacecraft between 1963 and 1976 including the manned Voskhod, which gave this rocket its common name (see “The Mission of Voskhod 1”). Like the earlier Voskhod launch vehicle, the 11A511 was built to a set of strict reliability requirements known as the “3KA Regulations” so that the launch vehicle was man-rated from the start. The 11A511 with the Soyuz stacked on top was 50 meters tall and had a launch mass of 310 metric tons. With a liftoff thrust of 4,050 kilonewtons, it was capable of placing up to about seven metric tons in low Earth orbit.

Other variants of the Soyuz spacecraft that were being developed at this time included the 7K-LOK (for “lunar orbital ship”) which would be launched to the Moon along with the LK (“lunar ship”) lunar lander and other hardware on the huge N-1 rocket being developed by OKB-1 for the Soviet’s manned lunar landing mission. The service module of the 7K-LOK was significantly enlarged and the DM’s heat shield was beefed up to handle the more punishing reentry following a return from the Moon. By the end of 1965, Korolev’s proposed 7K-L1 circum-lunar spacecraft was also approved for development. This would be a stripped-down version of the 7K without an orbital module and fitted with a Blok D stage borrowed from the N-1 program that could be launched on a UR-500K rocket developed and built by the rival OKB-52 design bureau (see “The Largest Launch Vehicles Through History”). The UR-500K (which today is known as the Proton) would send the spacecraft into low Earth orbit with the Blok D stage providing the final push towards the Moon where the 7K-L1 would perform a loop around our neighbor and follow a free return trajectory back to Earth.

 

Preparing Soyuz for Flight

The VPK decree of August 18, 1965 stated that the first pair of Soyuz 7K-OK spacecraft were to be delivered during the fourth quarter of 1965 with the first automated test flights launched during the first quarter of 1966. The first manned test flight was scheduled for the second quarter of 1966 leaving a hiatus of just over a year between the first Soyuz flight and the last Soviet crewed spaceflight of Voskhod 2 in March 1965 (see “The Mission of Voskhod 2”). The plan for the first Soyuz mission was to first launch the active spacecraft followed by the passive target a day later. If the target was inserted into orbit within about 20 kilometers of the active Soyuz, the latter would use its “Igla” (Russian for “needle”) rendezvous system to perform an automated docking during the first or second orbit. Otherwise, the docking would take place after 24 hours to allow the spacecraft to perform a less aggressive rendezvous profile while the spacecraft were largely out of direct contact with Soviet tracking stations. The spacecraft would remain docked for three days and return to Earth after each had spent four days in orbit.

During the first pair of manned test flights, it was planned that one cosmonaut would be launched in the active Soyuz while three would follow in the Soyuz acting as the target orbited the next day. After rendezvousing and docking, two cosmonauts from the second Soyuz would perform an EVA to transfer to the first. This would be a rehearsal for the procedure which would eventually be employed by a cosmonaut transferring between the LOK and LK during a manned lunar mission. This ambitious mission would allow the Soviet Union to catchup and (by some measures) surpass the accomplishments of the American Gemini missions (see this web site’s Gemini page). By September 1965, the first group of cosmonauts had been selected to begin training for the Soyuz program.

But as happens far too often with the introduction of any new complex spacecraft (American or Soviet), the development and production of Soyuz took far longer than planned. The situation was only made worse on January 14, 1966 when Korolev died during a botched operation to remove intestinal tumors. Following Korolev’s death, his deputy, Vasili Mishin, took control of the design bureau which was renamed TsKBEM (the Russian acronym for “Central Construction Bureau of Experimental Machine Building”) in March 1966. By the time Mishin was formally appointed as the Chief Designer of TsKBEM in May 1966, he was planning the first manned Soyuz flights for August but as before, this deadline would also be missed. The first Soyuz flight model was not delivered for ground testing until May 12 and eventually 2,123 defects were identified. Instead of the planned one month of testing and repair, four were needed to fix the problems which were found. In the meantime, other issues were cropping up elsewhere in the Soyuz test program such as a series of failures of the DM’s parachute system experienced during drop tests.

 

The First Test Flights

After months of delays, the first pair of Soyuz spacecraft were finally ready for the initial test flights of the Soyuz which would attempt the first automated docking in orbit. On November 28, 1966, 11A511 serial number U150002 lifted off from Area 31 at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Soviet Kazakhstan carrying the 6,386-kilogram 7K-OK No. 2 (with the “active” 7K-OK spacecraft receiving even serial numbers while the “passive” targets received odd ones). Known as Kosmos 133 once it achieved orbit, this first Soyuz prototype immediately experienced problems with its attitude sensing and control systems. As a result, the launch of 7K-OK No. 1 on November 29 was cancelled as all efforts turned towards getting Kosmos 133 safely home. After a series of four deorbit attempts over two days were foiled by malfunctions in the solar and ion-based attitude sensors, a fifth and final deorbit attempt during the mission’s 34^th orbit finally brought Kosmos 133 back to Earth. Unfortunately, the trajectory was flatter than desired so that the DM of Kosmos 133 came down far downrange east of the Mariana Islands in the Pacific. A 23-kilogram self-destruct charge was automatically detonated and destroyed the descending capsule.

As the causes of the system failures experienced during the Kosmos 133 mission were diagnosed and corrected, it was decided that the next unmanned Soyuz test flight would be a simpler solo mission using 7K-OK No. 1. On December 14, 1966, the four boosters of 11A511 serial number U150002 ignited on the pad at Area 31 but then quickly shutdown as automatic systems detected a problem with the core stage’s RD-108 engine. After the rocket had been powered down, ground crews returned to the launch pad to safe the rocket. Unfortunately, the Soyuz systems had not been properly shutdown and, without warning, the LES was inadvertently activated pulling the unoccupied DM clear of the launch pad. The activation of the LES ignited coolant gushing out of the Soyuz SM which remained behind starting a fire at the top of the stack which quickly engulfed the rocket on the pad forcing an evacuation. Within two minutes, the rocket blew up destroying the pad at Area 31 (only one of two launch pads configured to launch the Soyuz) while seriously injuring several members of the ground crew and killing one.

While the launch facilities at Area 1 (where all previous Soviet crewed spaceflights had been launched) were being upgraded to support a pair Soyuz launches in quick succession, 7K-OK No. 3 was modified to attempt another unmanned solo test flight. After numerous delays, what would become Kosmos 140 lifted off from the Baikonur Cosmodrome on February 7, 1967. While everything seemed to be going as planned, by the fourth orbit trouble appeared when the attitude control propellant levels had dropped by half due to a malfunction in the astro-orientation system. This malfunction also complicated performing orbital maneuvers and prevented the spacecraft from orienting its solar panels towards the Sun to recharge its batteries. The decision was made to bring Kosmos 140 home early on February 9. While the deorbit burned worked, the DM landed 510 kilometers short of its landing zone on the ice-covered Aral Sea instead. The DM quickly broke through the ice and sank in ten meters of water. After being dragged to dry land by an Mi-6 helicopter, it was discovered that a three by one centimeter hole had been burned clean through the heat shield which caused the DM to sink upon its unplanned splashdown and would have surely killed any crew on board. It was later found that a maintenance plug had been improperly sealed during manufacture resulting in the failure.

Without a single successful unmanned test flight, it was decided to risk the launching a manned docking attempt to take advantage of the lull in NASA’s Apollo program following the loss of the Apollo 1 crew on January 27, 1967 (see “The Future That Never Came: The Unflown Mission of Apollo 1”). While the problem with the heat shield experienced during the Kosmos 140 mission could be avoided by inspections of the flight hardware, it was argued that the other failures in the spacecraft’s automatic systems could have been overcome by the intervention of a pilot onboard. Although there were reservations, plans moved forward to launch 7K-OK No. 4 carrying veteran cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov followed by 7K-OK No. 5 two days later carrying veteran cosmonaut Valery Bykovsky as well as Alexei Yeliseyev and Yevgeny Khrunov who would perform an EVA crew transfer after docking.

Soon after being launched on April 23, 1967, the 6,450-kilogram Soyuz 1 immediately started experiencing problems. First one of the pair of solar panels needed to power the spacecraft failed to deploy. Komarov also had problems orienting his spacecraft in part due to issues encountered with the trouble-plagued attitude sensors. With the launch of “Soyuz 2”, as it would have been called, now cancelled, all efforts turned to getting Komarov safely back to Earth. Using all of his piloting skills, Komarov was able to finally execute the deorbit burn required to get him back home. Unfortunately, a malfunction in the parachute system resulted in the crash of the Soyuz 1 DM which killed Komarov on impact. The Soyuz program was brought to a halt just as had happened with the American Apollo program (for more details on the Soyuz 1 mission and the earlier unmanned test flights, see “The Avoidable Tragedy of Soyuz 1”).

 

A New Round of Test Flights

Just as had happened in the wake of the Apollo 1 accident, Soviet authorities formed a commission after the loss of Soyuz 1 to investigate the causes of the failure and recommend changes to the spacecraft and procedures. High on the list of 200 recommendations made in the report released on May 25, 1967 involved the Soyuz system of main and reserve parachutes. A new series of drop tests of a modified parachute system were to be conducted along with thorough testing of existing Soyuz hardware to resolve existing issues as well as uncover other potential problem areas.

At a meeting of the Council of Chief Designers held on May 29, 1967, Mishin outlined the future flight manifest for the Soyuz program. After the Soyuz had been cleared for automated test flights, a pair of unmanned Soyuz spacecraft would be launched in August to conduct an automated docking in orbit. It was hoped a pair of manned spacecraft would then follow in October or November to conduct the original Soyuz 1/2 mission with a docking followed by an EVA crew transfer.

In the end, this schedule proved to be too ambitious. Preparations of 7K-OK No. 5 (the same spacecraft which was originally supposed to fly a crew as “Soyuz 2”) and No. 6 to be used in the test flight took longer than planned pushing the expected launch date out to mid-October. Problems were also encountered during airdrop tests of the new parachute system which started on August 23. Of the twenty drops conducted over the following month, half experienced serious malfunctions with three failing outright. A drop test using a DM mockup on October 6 deployed its parachute properly but the braking rockets which were supposed to fire just a meter or so above the ground to cushion the impact of touchdown instead fired at an altitude of two kilometers. This malfunction resulted in a rough landing which surely would have injured any crew on board. A second drop test six days later went better but still experienced problems. On October 16, the new parachute system was cleared for automated test flights but much more work would be required before any manned mission which now would take place sometime in 1968.

Given the multiple issues experienced during the previous flights of 7K-OK hardware and with the failure of Soyuz 1 still fresh in their minds, it was decided to take a more conservative approach to the upcoming unmanned dual mission. The “active” Soyuz 7K-OK No.6, would be launched first and its systems tested. If no problems were encountered, the “passive” 7K-OK No. 5 spacecraft would be launched two days later. But instead of performing an automated docking, the two spacecraft would simply rendezvous and approach to within 50 to 70 meters of each other with no actual docking attempted. Based on NASA’s experience with the Gemini docking missions, Mishin and others on his team felt that the automated Igla system might not be up to the task and that a cosmonaut would probably be needed to perform the corrections during final approach required for a successful docking.

At 12:30 Moscow Time on October 27, 1967, 7K-OK No. 6 lifted off atop of its 11A511 rocket from the repaired pad in Area 31 at the Baikonur Cosmodrome and was successfully placed into an initial 209 by 235 kilometer orbit with an inclination of 51.7°. Officially designated Kosmos 186 and given the call sign Amur by ground controllers, the spacecraft successfully deployed its solar arrays and activated the Igla docking system. A problem with the solar-stellar orientation system resulted in an aborted course change on October 28 during the 17^th orbit but ground controllers were able to resolve the issue and maneuver Kosmos 186 into the desired orbit resulting in only a one-day delay in the launch of the second unmanned Soyuz.

At 12:12 Moscow Time on October 30, 1967, 7K-OK No. 5 was finally launched from the Area 1 “Gagarin Pad” which had been used for all previous manned Soviet spaceflights. Kosmos 188, also known by the call sign Baikal by ground controllers, was successfully placed into a 200 by 276 kilometer orbit. Because of the accuracy of the 11A511 launch vehicle guidance, the passive Baikal was only 24 kilometers away from the active Amur which was now on its 49^th orbit. Given the proximity of the spacecraft to each other and with their systems operating as expected, the decision was made not only to proceed with a rendezvous but attempt an automated docking as well. While there was little expectation that the docking would be successful, it was deemed worth the attempt. Before the spacecraft passed beyond the range of Soviet tracking stations, commands were sent to begin the automated rendezvous and docking procedure.

Out of contact with ground controllers, Kosmos 186 began a series of maneuvers to approach Kosmos 188. Less than 62 minutes after the launch of Kosmos 188, the two spacecraft managed to beat the odds and successfully docked at a speed estimated to be 0.1 to 0.5 meters per second at contact. This was the fastest rendezvous and docking by spacecraft after launch, unmanned or otherwise, handily beating the previous record of 103 minutes held by NASA’s Gemini 11 mission (see “Gemini 11: Preparing for Apollo”). The first indication of success came from a short wave signal capable of travelling over the horizon from the orbiting ships. Fifteen minutes later as the docked spacecraft passed over Soviet territory, television images returned from orbit confirmed the successful docking. After years of effort and painful sacrifice, Amur and Baikal had completed the first automated docking in orbit.

As the Soviet press rightfully hailed the achievement, ground controllers reviewing the telemetry discovered that everything had not gone completely as planned. The attitude control engines on Kosmos 188 had been fired more than expected during the rendezvous and consumed so much propellant that there were concerns about its ability to return home. It was also found that while the docking probe on Kosmos 186 had latched into the drogue on its sister craft, the hard docking interfaces were still 8.5 centimeters apart preventing mechanical and electrical mating of the pair of spacecraft. After 3½ hours of docked operations, the two spacecraft separated to continue on their independent flights.

The first ship to be brought down was Kosmos 186 on October 31 during its 65^th orbit. While the deorbit burn was successful, a malfunction in the astro-orientation system forced the DM to follow a more punishing ballistic reentry instead of a guided trajectory which would use the lift of the DM to lessen the g-loads and steer the craft to its landing zone. Despite this malfunction, the new parachute system worked as intended on this first post-Soyuz 1 test flight with the DM soft landing after almost four days in orbit.

With its propellant reserves running low, it was decided to bring Kosmos 188 home early after only three days in orbit. Unfortunately, issues with the attitude sensor system resulted in a much more shallow trajectory than desired after the deorbit burn on November 2, 1967 which would cause the DM to overshoot its intended landing site. Onboard automatic systems detected the error and detonated the craft’s self-destruct package (which would not be employed during manned missions) at an altitude of 60 to 70 kilometers over Irkutsk to prevent Baikal’s DM from landing intact outside of Soviet territory. Only later was it determined that had the DM not been destroyed, it would have landed only 400 kilometers beyond its landing zone but still safely inside Soviet territory.

 

The Kosmos 212 & 213 Mission

While the Kosmos 186/188 mission was largely successful and provided positive propaganda in time for the 50^th anniversary of the October Revolution, it was clear that the 7K-OK required more work before a crew could be committed to a flight. At a meeting of the Soyuz State Commission on November 15, 1967, it was decided that another pair of automated Soyuz spacecraft would be launched in March or April of 1968 with the first manned flight not to be attempted before May or June. Continued testing of the new Soyuz parachute system uncovered additional issues with qualification for manned flights not expected until at least the end of May. In addition, testing of the all-important life support system and sea trials required to validate the craft for unplanned water landings still needed to be completed. By February of 1968, it was clear that the first manned flight of Soyuz could not take place until the second half of the year.

For the next unmanned test flights, 7K-OK No. 7 and 8 were fitted with new infrared sensors like those successfully employed on the long-running Zenit-series reconnaissance satellites (see “Vostok’s Legacy”) to supplement the troublesome ion and solar-based attitude sensing systems. The mission would not only continue flight qualification of the Soyuz but also include a guided lifting reentry as a primary objective. This new mission would attempt to simulate as closely as possible the planned manned docking and EVA mission with the primary and backup crews of the planned manned flights participating from mission control to supplement their training. At 13:00 Moscow Time on April 14, 1968, 7K-OK No. 8 lifted off from the Baikonur Cosmodrome and was successfully placed into an initial 210 by 239 kilometer orbit with an inclination of 51.7°. System checks on what was now called Kosmos 212 indicated that all systems were performing as expected as the spacecraft maneuvered in preparation for its rendezvous.

The following day, the passive 7K-OK No. 7 was launched at 12:34 Moscow time. Kosmos 213, as it was now called, was successfully placed into a 205 by 291 kilometer orbit with an inclination of 51.4° only four kilometers from its sister craft. With all systems operating well, Kosmos 212 immediately started its automated sequence of rendezvous maneuvers. As the pair of spacecraft moved beyond the range of Soviet tracking stations, they were separated by only 335 meters with a closing speed of two meters per second. As had happened during the Kosmos 186/188 mission, docking would take place beyond Soviet territory and out of contact with ground controllers.

At 13:13 Moscow Time, Kosmos 212 and 213 successfully docked with each other only 57 minutes after the launch of the latter. After the joined spacecraft flew over Soviet territory, television images as well as telemetry confirmed that not only had the docking been successful, but that hard docking had also been achieved with the spacecraft mechanically and electrically joined. Joint operations continued for 3 hours, 50 minutes before the command was given to separate and continue independent missions to test spacecraft systems.

The two spacecraft continued to operate successfully during their respective flights until April 17 when a test of the main engine on Kosmos 212 for the eventual deorbit burn was aborted due to a problem orienting the craft during the 51^st orbit. Ground controllers quickly devised a backup plan which used the television images of the Earth returned by Kosmos 212 to provide attitude cues just as cosmonauts would do under similar circumstances. On April 19, Kosmos 212 successfully fired its main engine to begin its return home after almost five days in orbit.

For the first time, the DM on 7K-OK No. 8 successfully flew a guided reentry profile using the natural lift of the DM design with a soft landing occurring only 55 kilometers short of its intended landing site near the city of Karaganda in the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, the otherwise successful landing was marred by the 79 to 83 kilometer per hour winds which dragged the DM by its parachute for several kilometers across the steppes after touchdown resulting in serious damage to the exterior. Manned flights would not suffer from this issue since the parachute would be manually detached by the crew onboard after touchdown. Likewise, Kosmos 213 successfully returned home the following day and came down 157 kilometers from its planned landing site near Tselinograd. As had happened to its sister craft, the DM was dragged across the ground after touchdown by the 90 kilometer per hour winds across the Kazak steppes. Aside from these post touchdown issues, which would not impact manned missions, the Kosmos 212 and 213 missions were resounding successes.

 

The Plan

During the early months of 1968, there was a debate about the details of the first manned flights of the 7K-OK following the Soyuz 1 disaster. Various combinations of the number of cosmonauts to be flown on each spacecraft and whether or not an EVA transfer would even be attempted were examined. While the new primary parachute system was expected to be certified for manned flight by the first half of August, there were still issues with the fast-opening reserve parachute as well as the emergency rescue system. On June 10, the Soyuz State Commission decided on one of the more conservative approaches that had been considered following a meeting of the Council of Chief Designers twelve days earlier. One more unmanned flight of a single Soyuz would be conducted in July as a final orbital test of the 7K-OK. After this, the launch of an unmanned Soyuz in September would be followed by a manned launch carrying a single cosmonaut the next day. Unlike the previous docking missions, the passive unmanned Soyuz would be launched first. Only after the target vehicle was in orbit and shown to be operating properly would a cosmonaut be risked with the launch of the active Soyuz. If all of these flights went as planned, only then would the original docking and EVA transfer mission involving a total of four cosmonauts on two ships be attempted in November.

The primary crew member of the next manned Soyuz test flight would be 47 year old Captain Georgi Beregovoi of the Soviet Air Force. The oldest person to have flown in space up until that time, Beregovoi joined the cosmonaut corps on January 25, 1964 after a career as a military test pilot. His first assignment was to train as the backup pilot for the long duration Voskhod 3 mission before it was ultimately cancelled in 1966 as one of the first actions by Mishin as the new Chief Designer of TsKBEM. By 1967, he had joined the group of cosmonauts training for the Soyuz program and by the fall of that year had begun training on a docking simulator. Beregovoi’s backup was 41 year old Captain Vladimir Shatalov who had joined the cosmonaut corps in January 1963 and had previously trained as the backup commander of the cancelled Voskhod 3 mission. The reserve crew member was 33 year old Captain Boris Volynov who was part of the first group of cosmonauts chosen in 1960 and had been the backup crew member for numerous earlier missions as well as the commander of the cancelled Voskhod 3.

After being delayed for a month by continuing issues with the Soyuz parachute system, the unmanned 7K-OK No. 9 was launched at 13:00 Moscow Time on August 28, 1968. Known as Kosmos 238 once it was inserted into its initial 199 by 219 kilometer orbit, little is known about this mission in the West even after half a century save for an orbit raising maneuver on August 30. The DM of Kosmos 238 successfully landed on September 1 after a flight of almost four days. The flight was apparently successful and, with the certification of the parachute system for manned flight on September 23, the way was clear for a manned Soyuz flight.

 

The Soyuz 2 & 3 Mission

With the successful completion of the 11-day Apollo 7 mission on October 22, 1968 which qualified the Apollo CSM for manned lunar missions (see “Apollo 7: Rise of the Phoenix”), the pressure was on to restart manned Soviet spaceflights. On the day after the recovery of Apollo 7, the State Commission set October 25 as the launch date for the unmanned 7K-OK No. 11 target craft to be designated “Soyuz 2” – the first unmanned flight to receive a manned spacecraft designation (earlier unmanned flights of the Vostok had been designated “Korabl Sputnik” while those for the Voskhod and Soyuz programs were part of the varied “Kosmos” series).  The manned 7K-OK No. 10 with Beregovoi on board would be launched the following day and called “Soyuz 3”.

The unmanned Soyuz 2 lifted off on schedule from Area 1 at the Baikonur Cosmodrome at 12:00 Moscow Time on October 25, 1968 and was successfully placed into an initial 185 by 224 kilometer orbit with an inclination of 51.7°. With everything operating on the spacecraft as expected including a subsequent maneuver to circularize its orbit, the way was clear for the launch of the 6,575-kilogram Soyuz 3 at 11:34 Moscow Time the next day from Area 31 – the first launch of a manned Soviet spacecraft from a pad other than that of Area 1. After successfully entering an initial 205 by 225 kilometer orbit, Soviet authorities announced the launch of both spacecraft now that it was apparent the mission was on thus ending an 18-month hiatus in manned Soviet space missions. Only 11 kilometers apart after Soyuz 3 entered orbit, the Igla docking system was activated on both spacecraft to start the rendezvous procedure.

During Beregovoi’s first orbit, the Igla docking system automatically made a series of orbit corrections bringing the two Soyuz spacecraft within 200 meters of each other with external television camera’s providing a view of the operation to ground controllers below. At this point, Beregovoi took manual control of Soyuz 3 to complete the docking out of contact with mission control.

Everything seemed to be going as planned until the two spacecraft were about 40 to 50 meters apart. Beregovoi attempted to align the two spacecraft for docking but his inputs resulted in Soyuz 2 automatically changing its attitude in the direction opposite of that expected. Not understanding the nature of the problem, Beregovoi continued to struggle to get the pair of spacecraft aligned with more firings of his attitude control system but ended up flying past his target. After another attempt to perform a docking with the same results, Beregovoi was forced to abort the attempt and allow Soyuz 2 and 3 to drift apart. Out of touch with ground controllers and with no flight engineer available onboard to help the him diagnose the problem, Beregovoi had little choice.

A subsequent post-flight investigation suggested that pilot error was to blame for the problem. But, in all fairness, the rookie cosmonaut’s training seemed to have played a central role in the failure. The simulators used in docking training were apparently not accurate representations of the Soyuz craft and Beregovoi was never briefed about the actual appearance of the 7K-OK in orbit which would have provided vital cues about the relative attitudes of the two craft. While he had aligned his spacecraft so that the solar wings of Soyuz 2 were oriented properly in his periscope during his approach, he inadvertently had the roll angle of Soyuz 3 with respect to Soyuz 2 off by 180° – in other words, he was approaching Soyuz 2 upside down compared to the orientation required for docking. When he gave inputs to align the attitudes of the two spacecraft, the Igla system automatically sent signals to Soyuz 2 which resulted in its attitude changing in the direction opposite from that expected. Changes to training and procedures would be required to avoid a repeat on subsequent Soyuz missions.

Because Beregovoi had used 80 kilograms of attitude control propellant as he struggled to get the two spacecraft aligned for docking, no additional docking attempts could be made leaving just 8 to 10 kilograms left for the rest of the mission. After the fifth orbit, Beregovoi entered the fairly spacious orbital module (OM) to begin a much needed rest period as the ground track of Soyuz 3 drifted beyond Soviet tracking coverage for ten hours starting at 19:18 Moscow Time.

After waking up on October 27, Beregovoi exercised for 25 minutes and then proceeded with his day’s activities onboard his new spacecraft. These included numerous systems checks as well as learning to live aboard the Soyuz. Beregovoi noted that one of the OM portholes fogged up on the exterior making it difficult to view outside and dust was present between the other portholes’ panes of glass. And just as NASA had done during the Apollo 7 mission, Beregovoi gave a television tour of his spacecraft and the amenities it provided (although unlike Apollo 7, these telecasts were not shared live with the public). Soyuz 3 also conducted another rendezvous exercise with Soyuz 2 to close the 565-kilometer gap between the two craft but, with propellant reserves running low, no close-proximity activities including docking could be attempted. Afterwards, Soyuz 3 maneuvered into a 197 by 252 kilometer orbit while Soyuz 2 moved into a lower 181 by 231 kilometer orbit in preparation for its return home.

At 10:25 Moscow Time on October 28, Soyuz 2 fired its braking engines on its 48^th orbit at the conclusion of its independent mission of testing the systems of the 7K-OK. Although there was a problem with the astro-orientation system, the DM of Soyuz 2 managed to perform an automatic guided reentry touching down at 10:56 Moscow Time concluding its mission of 70 hours and 56 minutes. The DM had come down just 42 kilometers short of its intended landing zone near the city of Karaganda having met the majority of its mission objectives.

Meanwhile, Beregovoi continued his flight aboard Soyuz 3. A second television broadcast was made after midday where the cosmonaut pointed out the various instruments on board his spacecraft. Also included during these last two days of his mission were experiments including medical tests. It had been over five years since the Soviet Union had flown a manned space mission that was more than a day long and this was an opportunity to continue studying the effects of weightlessness on humans. Beregovoi also maneuvered Soyuz 3 into a higher 199 by 244 kilometer orbit.

Beregovoi’s last day in orbit started at 03:45 Moscow Time on October 29. He conducted a third television broadcast from Soyuz 3 providing views out the portholes of his spacecraft. He continued to have a healthy appetite and felt no disorientation despite suffering from a mild case of space sickness during the first 12 hours of the flight. He also conducted a second day of observations of stars and planets as well as the Earth below taking photographs of a range of geographic features and weather phenomena. His final Earth observation experiment involved taking photographs of the Earth through an orange filter (in order to cut down on atmospheric scattering) using photometrically marked black and white film.

On October 30, Beregovoi started stowing loose equipment and preparing for his return home. A problem with the attitude control sensing system made it necessary to align Soyuz 3 manually for the deorbit burn with the gyroscopes maintaining the attitude for an orbit after which he manually fired his braking rocket for 145 seconds over the Atlantic Ocean to start his final descent home on his 64^th orbit. The Soyuz 3 DM made a guided, low-g reentry and landed at 10:25 Moscow Time not far from Karaganda for a total flight time of 94 hours, 50 minutes and 45 seconds. Fortunately, a blizzard had already passed through the area earlier in the day so that Soyuz 3 came down on a drift of soft snow, much to the surprise of a passing boy with his donkey. Beregovoi and his ship were quickly recovered to begin the long process of debriefings and examinations.

Despite the problems encountered during the flight with the docking, the Soyuz 2/3 mission was largely successful and demonstrated that the 7K-OK was ready for more ambitious manned missions as well as providing a much need morale boost for the Soyuz program participants. Georgi Beregovoi left the cosmonaut corps in 1969 and was later promoted to Major General to run the Soviet’s Cosmonaut Training Center from June 1972 to January 1987. In the meantime, all efforts turned towards the upcoming Soyuz 4/5 mission which would attempt a manned docking and EVA crew transfer.

 

Follow Drew Ex Machina on Facebook.

 

Related Reading

“The Avoidable Tragedy of Soyuz 1”, Drew Ex Machina, April 23, 2017 [Post]

“Apollo 7: Rise of the Phoenix”, Drew Ex Machina, October 24, 2018 [Post]

 

General References

Phillip Clark, The Soviet Manned Space Program, Orion Books, 1988

Rex D. Hall and David J. Shayler, Soyuz: A Universal Spacecraft, Springer-Praxis, 2003

Nicholas Johnson, Handbook of Soviet Manned Space Flight, Univelt, 1980

Asif A. Siddiqi, The Soviet Space Race with Apollo, University Press of Florida, 2003